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NOTE
AN ADEQUATE EIS UNDER NEPA: DEFERENCE TO
CEQ; MERELY CONCEPTUAL LISTING OF
MITIGATION LEADS US TO A MERELY CONCEPTUAL
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
INTRODUCTION

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council' establishes two general
propositions: first, the Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ) interpretation of environmental impact statement (EIS) requirements supersedes
conflicting judicial interpretations. Secondly, the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)-through the EIS-imposes procedural duties even
less stringent than previously interpreted.
In Robertson, citizens groups challenged the Forest Service's issuance
of a special use permit2 for the development of a ski resort in a pristine
national forest. Petitioners alleged that the EIS prepared by the Forest
Service did not meet the requirements of NEPA. 3 The Supreme Court,
in reversing the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, held that
the EIS was adequate. The Court found that NEPA does not require
agencies to include in each EIS a fully developed mitigation plan, nor to
actually mitigate; nor does it impose a duty on an agency to handle
uncertainty with a "worst case analysis" in its EIS. 4
1. 490 U.S. 332, 104 L.Ed.2d 351, 109 S.Ct. 1835 (1989).
2. A special use permit is necessary whenever a private party seeks to use lands owned by the
federal government. The Forest Service issues special use permits under authority of 16 U.S.C.
§497 (1982).
3. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub.L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), 42
U.S.C. §§4321-70(b) (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 4332 mandates completion of an EIS, a detailed statement analyzing the environmental
impacts of "major" governmental actions. The Act states, in pertinent part, that all agencies of the
Federal Government shall:
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. §4332(C)(1970).
4. Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1837. The Court also held that the U.S. Forest Service's failure to
develop a complete mitigation plan did not violate its own regulations, reversing the Ninth Circuit's
holding. Id. at'1837-38. Forest Service regulations require, inter alia, that "[e]ach special use
authorization... contain... [t]erms and conditions which will.., minimize damage to... the
environment." Id. at 1847-49.
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By its holding, the Court first approved CEQ final regulatory authority,
reiterating the principles of substantial deference to agency regulations
and decisionmaking. The Court focused on the issue of whether NEPA
imposes any substantive duty to reduce environmental harm, proclaiming
that NEPA does not. And the Court deemphasized an important issue
concerning the procedural duty under NEPA. By also affirming a "merely
conceptual" ' mitigation plan as adequate, the Court's holding is inherently
inconsistent with its own interpretation of EIS purposes-to fully inform
agencies and the public during the decisionmaking process. A merely
conceptual mitigation plan does not serve either purpose. Because an EIS
has been the most important mechanism for implementing NEPA, the
Court's holding dilutes the power of NEPA to protect the environment.
In addition, by choosing to affirm CEQ's regulation (rejecting worst case
analysis) with only cursory review and increased deference, and in spite
of conflicting judicial principles, the Court subjects NEPA to greater
susceptibility to political whim. Thus, the Robertson decision weakens
the power of NEPA to achieve "significant substantive goals for the
Nation. "'6
THE FACTS IN ROBERTSON
Sandy Butte, overlooking the Methow Valley, is a 6,000-foot mountain
located in the Okanagoan National Forest of Washington. In May 1989,
Sandy Butte was still distinctive as "an unspoiled, sparsely populated
area that the trial court characterized as 'pristine.'" 7
In 1978, Methow Recreation, Inc. (MRI) applied for a special use
permit to develop and operate its proposed "Early Winters Ski Resort."
The proposed resort was to employ approximately 3,900 acres of Sandy
Butte and 1,165 acres of surrounding land. Pursuant to NEPA, and in
conjunction with state and county officials, the Forest Service produced
an EIS, the Early Winters Alpine Winter Sports Study, in the first stage
of a three-stage process of environmental assessment unique to the Forest
Service. 8
In the first stage of this process, the Forest Service must examine the
general environmental and financial feasibility of a proposed project and
an EIS must be prepared. 9 The second stage ordinarily consists of selecting
5.
6.
U.S.
7.
8.
9.

Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1837.
Quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
519, 558, (1978).
Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1839.
See 36 C.F.R. §251.54(f) (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1969). Issuing the permit would qualify as a major federal action.
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the developer and reaching agreements on the development. Then a special
use permit may be issued. However, the special use permit does not give
the developer the right to begin construction; rather, it verifies the suitability of the site for development of a predetermined type. " In the third
and final stage, the Service evaluates the "master plan" for development,
construction, and operation of the project. Construction may begin only
after completion of an additional environmental analysis-a full-blown
EIS if necessary-and final approval of the developer's master plan."
This case challenges the issuance of the special use permit by challenging the EIS in the initial stage in the Forest Service's three-stage
process. Curiously, the Forest Service drafted its EIS with an eye toward
a particular developer (MRI) and a particular development plan (ski resort
Master Plan) already in its first stage. 2 The EIS goal, however, was stated
more generally:
to provide the information required to evaluate the potential for skiing
at Early Winters [and] to assist in making a decision whether to issue
a Special Use Permit for downhill skiing on all or a portion of
approximately 3900 acres of National Forest System land. 13
The EIS discussed the effects of five levels of development that would
ensue both on-site and off-site. " However, the EIS merely identified ways
to mitigate adverse effects, which were predicted to occur primarily offsite."' CEQ regulations require an EIS to identify, discuss, and analyze
steps that mitigate adverse impacts.' 6 The EIS at issue conceded that the
proposed mitigation steps were "merely conceptual" and reported they
"would 'be made more specific as part of the design and implementation
stages of the planning process."" 7 Plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of
this reporting of mitigation steps.
Plaintiffs also challenged the EIS for its treatment of effects of ski
development on wildlife and on air quality. In regard to wildlife, the EIS
concluded that the only effect on sensitive species would be the loss of
10. See 36 C.F.R. §251.56(c) (1988).
11. Id.
12. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 104 L.Ed.2d 351, 109 S.Ct.
1835, 1839-40.
13. Id. at 1840.
14. As required by CEQ regulation 40 CFR § 1502.16(b) (1987).
15. "The requirement that an EIS contain a detailed discussion of possible mitigation measures
flows from both the language of the Act [NEPAl and, more expressly, from CEQ's implementing
regulations." Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1846. "CEQ regulations require that the agency discuss possible
mitigation measures in defining the scope of the EIS, 40 CFR § 1508.25(b) (1987), in discussing
-alternatives to the proposed action, § 1502.14(f), and consequences of that action, § 1502.16(h),
and in explaining its ultimate decision, § 1505.2(c)." Id. at 1847.
16. 40 CFR §§ 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h), 1505.2(c), 1508.25(b) (1987).
17. Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1837.
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a pair of spotted owls.' 8 The EIS predicted that within ten years, 31
species would decrease and 24 would increase in numbers. The pine
marten and nesting goshawk would be eliminated altogether. The EIS
estimated only a 15 percent reduction in mule deer, depending on offsite development which reportedly could not be predicted.' 9 The Washington Department of Game challenged the accuracy of conclusions on
wildlife effects. Challengers2" asserted that a migratory herd of mule deer
of over 30,000, of significant value to the hunting industry, might be
reduced by more than half because of loss of their critical winter range
and migrating routes.
Regarding air quality, the wilderness at issue was a "Class I" pristine
area, to which the strictest Clean Air Act standards applied. 21 Off-site
development was again the source of uncertainty in projecting degradation. According to the EIS, the most significant effect would result during
severe weather inversion periods from automobile and wood burning
sources, reducing air quality such that in time the air would become more
polluted than state Total Suspended Solids standards allow.

22

Some listed

mitigation measures were suggestions directed to the county government,
not to MRI. 23 Project opponents questioned the adequacy of impact assessments based on mitigation measures which were undeveloped, and
further, which depended on third party cooperation that was unenforceable.
The Regional Forester decided to issue the permit, 4 but only on the
condition that the Forest Supervisor" identify and implement mitigating
measures to reduce adverse effects sure to result otherwise.26 Citizens
18. Since late 1989, a pair of spotted owls has created a legitimate challenge to any development
project potentially threatening their habitat, as the spotted owl is becoming more and more rare.
The old-growth forest is home for the "bark-colored spotted owl, who mates for life, lives in the
craggy cavities of 200 year-old trees, hunts on two-foot-wide wings a 2,500 acre territory to daily
eat its weight in quarry. 1,500 pairs remain: they vanish in proportion to their forest.
60,000 acres of old-growth are logged each year. 90% of Washington and Oregon old-growth is
gone, with 1 square mile more cut each week. Only 4% of California cathedral forest remains. We
have destroyed 96% of eaons of evolutionary achievement in a mere 90 years. The forest disappears
long before its last tree." Chez Liley, Compact Disc, Notes from Paul Winter Consort: Voices of a
Planet: Earth. Earth Music Productions, 1990.
19. Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1842.
20. The Washington Department of Game. Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1841.
21. The Clean Air Act, § 1, 42 U.S.C. §7473(b) (1982).
22. Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1840.
23. Id. at 1841. The study suggested that the county develop an air quality management plan
including monitoring and enforcement. Regarding wildlife, it suggested the county design roads
away from wildlife, restrict access during migrating season, impose zoning and taxing incentives
to reduce damage, etc. Id. at 1842.
24. The permit allowed development at the second highest level considered: a 16-lift ski area
able to accommodate 8,200 skiers at one time, as the EIS had recommended. Robertson, Id. at
1843.
25. Both independently and in cooperation with local government. Id.
26. Id.
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groups27 appealed to the Chief of the Forest Service, Dale Robertson,
who affirmed the Regional Forester's decision. The citizens then brought
suit" to review the Service's decision, alleging that the EIS did not satisfy
NEPA requirements.29 The District Court affirmed, concluding that the
EIS was sufficient." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 3 '
The appellate court declared the EIS inadequate, reasoning that: 1)
NEPA imposes a substantive duty on agencies to take action to mitigate
the adverse effects of major federal actions;32 2) every EIS must include
a detailed explanation of specific actions that will be taken to mitigate
adverse impacts;33 3) if the Forest Service had difficulty obtaining information adequate to make a reasoned assessment of the project's environmental impact, it had an obligation to make a "worst case analysis"
on the basis of available information, using reasonable projections of the
worst possible consequences.'
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, concluding that it misapplied NEPA and gave insufficient deference to the
Forest Service's interpretation of its own regulations. 35 The Supreme
Court unanimously 36 declared: 1) NEPA does not impose a substantive
duty on agencies to mitigate adverse environmental effects or to include
in each EIS a fully developed mitigation plan; and 2) NEPA does not
impose a duty on an agency to make a "worst case analysis" in its EIS
if it cannot make a reasoned assessment of a proposed project's environmental impact.37 Under conditions of scientific uncertainty, an agency
to project "reasonably foremust comply with the CEQ's new regulation
38
seeable significant adverse impacts."
27. Methow Valley Citizens Council, Washington State Sportsmen Council (although not a party
in the Supreme Court appeal), Washington Environmental Council, and the Cascade Chapter of the
Sierra Club. Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1843, n.ll.
28. The suit was brought pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706
(1988).
29. "Respondents also alleged violations of the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7626." 109 S.Ct. at 1843, n.12.
"These claims were dismissed on petitioner's motion for summary judgment and [were] not in issue
[on the appeal]. App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a." Id.
30. Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1843.
31. Methow, 833 F.2d. 810 (9th Cir. 1987).
32. Id.at 819.
'33. Id.
34. It also held that the Forest Service's failure to develop a complete mitigation plan violated
the agency's own regulations. Id. at 811-12.
35. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 104 L.Ed.2d 351, 109 S.Ct.
1835, 1838 (1989).
36. Justice Brennan concurred in the opinion, but wrote separately to emphasize that an important
ingredient of an EIS is the discussion of steps to mitigate adverse environmental impact. Robertson,
109 S.Ct. at 1851.
37. Supra note 4.
38. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1987).
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THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
(NEPA) OF 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq.

Congress enacted NEPA in response to a widely perceived need to
integrate environmental considerations into decisions of the federal government. NEPA declares that federal policy is "to use all practicable
means and measures ...

to create and maintain conditions under which

man and nature can exist in productive harmony" and preserve the environment for the future. 39 Although NEPA encompasses a broad policy
with significant substantive goals,' Robertson reaffirms that NEPA merely
mandates a process with which agencies must comply. Still, NEPA's broad
language invites controversy about the requirements of that process.
NEPA requires completion of an EIS, a detailed statement analyzing
the environmental impacts of proposed "major governmental actions. "4
It "places upon an agency the obligation to consider every significant
aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action." 42 Its first aim
"is to inject environmental considerations into the federal agency's decisionmaking process. The second aim is to inform the public, through
the disclosure of an EIS, that the agency has considered environmental
concerns in its decisionmaking process." 4 3 Thus, the EIS forces action

in two important respects: it forces agencies to consider the (previously
ignored) environmental consequences of their decisions, and it informs
39. 42 U.S.C. §4331 (1988).
Congressional declaration of national environmental policy.
(a) Creation and maintenance of conditions under which man and nature can exist
in productive harmony.
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations
of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of
population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and recognizes further the
critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall
welfare and development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal
Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned
public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including
financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the
general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements
of present and future generations of Americans.
42 U.S.C. §4331(a) (1988).
40. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519,
558 (1978) (The court held the agency EIS adequate under NEPA because it insured a fully informed
and well-considered decision, procedural requirements had been met, and deference to substantive
agency decision was owed).
41. 42 U.S.C. §4332(C)(i-v).
42. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 553.
43. Weinbergerv. CatholicAction ofHawaiilPeaceEducation Project,454 U.S. 139, 143, (198 1),
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)), (Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA (42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) held not
to require Navy to prepare and release "Hypothetical EIS" regarding possible nuclear weapons
storage when proposing constructing nuclear storage facility).
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the public that it is doing so with opportunity to comment. In this way,
the EIS is intended to provide a decisionmaking tool that helps agencies
to achieve the sweeping goals of NEPA.' The Robertson holding does
not aid this purpose.
NEPA also provides for a Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),
a three-member, appointed body of highly qualified experts. The CEQ's
functions include appraising activities in light of NEPA and formulating
and recommending policies to "promote and improve the quality of the
environment." 4 5 Part of the interpretive controversy surrounding NEPA
has concerned what weight agencies must give to CEQ recommendations
and directives. Initially, the CEQ issued guidelines which were not considered binding on agencies.' This changed when, in 1977, President
Carter ordered the CEQ to "[i]ssue regulations to Federal agencies for
the implementation of the procedural provisions" of NEPA. 47 In Andrus
v. SierraClub,4" the Supreme Court took note of this Order in determining
that "CEQ's interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference. 4 9
44. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 104, L.Ed.2d 351, 109 S.Ct.
1835, 1845. See generally § 1075, 91st Cong. 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 40415 (1969) (Conference
Report on NEPA). For elaboration on the value and significance of these informing purposes of an
EIS, see Weiss, Note, FederalAgency Treatmentof Uncertainty in EnvironmentalImpact Statements
Under the CEQ's Amended NEPA Regulation § 1502.22: Worst Case Analysis or Risk Threshold?,
86 Mich. L. Rev. 777, 785-87 (1988).
45. 42 U.S.C. §4342 (1988).
46. Consequently, courts differed on what exactly an EIS must contain. See generally, Note,
supra note 44, at 777.
47. Exec. Order No. 11991, 3 C.F.R. § 123 (1978). The CEQ regulations addressed the question
of how to handle uncertainty in an EIS by requiring a "worst case analysis." The pertinent regulation
follows:
Incomplete or unavailable information.
When an agency is evaluating significant adverse effects on the human environment
in an environmental impact statement and there are gaps in relevant information or
scientific uncertainty, the agency shall always make clear that such information is
lacking or that uncertainty exists.
(a) If the information relevant to adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice
among alternatives and is not known and the overall costs of obtaining it are not
exorbitant, the agency shall include the information in the environmental impact statement.
(b) If (1) the information relevant to adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned
choice among alternatives and is not known and the overall costs of obtaining it are
not exorbitant or (2) the information relevant to adverse impacts is important to the
decision and the means to obtain it are not known (for example, the means for obtaining
it are beyond the state of the art) the agency shall weigh the need for the action against
the risk and severity of possible adverse impacts were the action to proceed in the
face of uncertainty. If the agency proceeds, it shall include a worst case analysis and
an indication of the probability or improbability of its occurrence.
43 Fed.Reg. 55,997 (1978) (codified at 40 CFR § 1502.22 (1985)), (emphasis added).
48. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979). Andrus held that federal agencies' preparation
of EIS to accompany appropriation requests were not required under NEPA. Thus, the Court upheld
CEQ regulations. This case marked the beginning of giving CEQ regulations substantial deference,
as other agencies enjoy.
49. Id. at 358.
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Until Robertson, it was unclear whether the CEQ regulatory authority
would supersede conflicting judicial interpretation of NEPA. Robertson
further increases judicial deference to an agency, such that the CEQ has
the final word in interpreting the statute.
ANALYSIS
I. THE WORST CASE ANALYSIS REQUIREMENT
A. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis
Ninth Circuit decisions have consistently given precedential value to
the case law interpreting NEPA. In Methow Valley Citizens Council v.
5" the Ninth
Regional Forester,
Circuit Court of Appeals held that if the
government agency has difficulty obtaining adequate information upon
which to make a reasoned assessment of environmental impacts of proposed actions, it must engage in a "worst case analysis.""' The Methow
Valley court drew from reasoning in its own prior decisions to conclude
that this particular analysis is required in order to fulfill the purposes of
NEPA. 2
Ninth Circuit precedent followed the Fifth Circuit decision in Sierra
Club v. Sigler.53 In Sigler, the Sierra Club and others challenged construction permits for a deepwater port and crude oil distribution system
in Galveston Bay.54 Specifically, Sierra Club contended that in order to
fulfill NEPA requirements, 55the EIS must consider the worst case possibility of a massive oil spill in the ecologically sensitive bay. The Sigler
court looked at the purpose implied in NEPA language, 56 its legislative
history,57 prior case law, the CEQ's interpretation and its binding au50. 833 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1987).
51. Methow, 833 F.2d at 817. An amendment to the applicable CEQ regulation had removed the
worst case analysis requirement, however. Amendment discussed below.
52. "The purpose of the analysis is to carry out NEPA's mandate for full disclosure to the
public of the potential consequences of agency decisions, and to cause agencies to
consider those potential consequences when acting on the basis of scientific uncertainties or gaps in available information. The analysis is formulated on the basis of
available information, using reasonable projections of the worst possible consequences
of a proposed action."
Id. at 817, (quoting Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis
added).
53. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.1983).
54. Galveston Bay is 1) a much traveled commercial waterway; 2) "Texas' largest estuary" and
"a nursery and habitat for vast numbers of wildlife, including fish and migratory birds"; and 3)
central to the Texas commercial fishing industry, since the Bay is the habitat for these fish. Sigler,
695 F.2d at 961.
55. Id. at 964.
56. That language includes: "[R]esponsibility of federal government to avoid 'unintended' consequences of environmental use," 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3), (EIS to disclose all environmental impacts)
§ 4332(C).
57. Sigler, 695 F.2d at 970, n.9.

Winter 1991]

AN ADEQUATE EIS UNDER NEPA

thority, 8 all in addition to the regulation itself,59 to conclude that the EIS
must include a worst case analysis. In Methow Valley then, the court had
a precedential basis, in addition to the CEQ regulation, for requiring a
worst case analysis.'
Notably, after the Sigler decision and prior to the Methow Valley holding, the applicable CEQ regulation was amended. 6 The CEQ regulations
of 1978 had required a "worst case analysis" when an agency was faced
with inadequate or unverifiable information about environmental impacts. 62 The CEQ amendment dropped the worst case requirement, after
dissatisfaction with judicial interpretation and agency response to EIS
challenges. The CEQ believed that courts were requiring agencies to go
beyond the "rule of reason." 63 The new regulation replaces the "worst
case analysis" requirement with one merely requiring the agency to "evaluate" "reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts" for which
information is unavailable or incomplete. By amending the regulation to
58. Id. at 973.
59. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22. (Note that the old CEQ regulation was in effect.)
60. See discussion in text, supra, of this regulation.
61. The amended regulation follows:
§ 1502.22 Incomplete or unavailable information.
When an agency is evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on
the human environment in an environmental impact statement and there is incomplete
or unavailable information, the agency shall always make clear that such information
is lacking.
(a) If the incomplete information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and the overall costs
of obtaining it are not exorbitant, the agency shall include the information in the
environmental impact statement.
(b) If the information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts
cannot be obtained because the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or the means
to obtain it are not known, the agency shall include within the environmental impact
statement: (I) a statement that such information is incomplete or unavailable; (2) a
statement of the relevance of the incomplete or unavailable information to evaluating
reasonablyforeseeable significant adverse impacts on the human environment; (3) a
summary of existing credible scientific evidence which is relevant to evaluating the
reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts on the human environment; and (4)
the agency's evaluation of such impacts based upon theoretical approaches or research
methods generally accepted in the scientific community. For the purposes of this
section, "reasonably foreseeable" includes impacts which have catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, provided that the analysis of
the impacts is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture,
and is within the rule of reason.
(c) The amended regulation will be applicable to all environmental impact statements
for which a Notice of Intent (40 C.F.R. § 1508.22) is published in the Federal Register
on or after May 27, 1986. For environmental impact statements in progress, agencies
may choose to comply with the requirements of either the original or amended regulation.
51 Fed.Reg. 15625-26 (codified as 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1986)(emphasis added). For reasons supporting proposed amendments and comments, see generally 51 Fed.Reg. 15618-26 (Apr. 25, 1986).
62. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985).
63. See 50 Fed Reg. 32234-38 (Aug. 9, 1985).
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apply only to "reasonably foreseeable" impacts, the CEQ aimed to remove the unintended focus on incidents of remote possibility, so as to
encourage the preferred study of a wide range of possible consequences.'
Under the new regulation, any significant impacts which are "reasonably
foreseeable" must be discussed in the EIS in all instances when obtaining
complete information is prohibited by either exorbitant costs or limited
technology.65
The new regulation ostensibly relieves the agency of the obligation to
speculate on a worst case scenario, which can be both highly difficult
and unscientific. As a formal kind of risk analysis, the worst case analysis
required models and evaluative methods difficult to apply because of the
high degree of speculation, the possibility for omission of factors, and
the inclusion of incidents of very low probability.
The "reasonably foreseeable impacts" standard makes agency analysis
much simpler to justify and calculate. However, the less demanding
standard can also result in an EIS with less alarming, and perhaps less
complete conclusions on adverse impacts. By deciding insufficient foreseeability or significance exists, an agency could omit to evaluate those
impacts of extremely low probability which nevertheless result in the
most severe and irreparable damage as well as the most public outrage
and resistance to a project (for example, the Exxon-Valdez or Three Mile
Island accidents). Consequently, the new regulation reduces the public
disclosure value of an EIS and public resistance to projects.6'
Even after the CEQ eliminated the worst case requirement from its
NEPA regulations, the Methow Valley court required a worst case analysis,
relying upon part of the Sigler rationale. The Fifth Circuit had reasoned
that case law developed prior to the "worst case" regulation had interpreted NEPA to require agencies to weigh "costs of proceeding without
more and better information." '67 The Fifth Circuit also determined that
scientific uncertainty did not obliterate agencies' obligation to examine
impacts. This preregulation case law had developed a "rule of reason"
approach to uncertainty, which included "reasonable forecasting and speculation. "' A probability threshold developed: when the probability of a
significant effect was sufficiently high, even though scientific uncertainty
existed, the EIS must include acknowledgment of uncertainty with regard
64. Supra note 61.
65. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1987). Commentators on the proposed amendment were divided on
their opinion of the change. See generally, 51 Fed.Reg. 15618-26 (Apr. 25, 1986). (For example,
compare Yost, Don't Gut The Worst CaseAnalysis, 13 Envtl.L.Rep. 10,394 (Dec. 1983) with Brock,
Abolishing The Worst Case Analysis, 2 Nat. Resources & Env't. 22 (Spring 1986)).
66. For more on worst case analysis difficulties, see Note, supra note 44.
67. Sigler, 695 F.2d at 970 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410, n.21 (1976)).
68. Sigler, 695 F.2d at 970 (quoting Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic
Energy Commission, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092, (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
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to those effects. The agency was directed to balance the probability of
harm against magnitude of harm later, when deciding how to proceed,
rather than within the EIS.6 9 The Fifth Circuit translated these principles
into the CEQ's worst case analysis requirement; it found that the CEQ's
regulation had merely codified judicially created principles. 7" Similarly,
the Methow Valley court determined that the adequacy of an EIS should
be judged by the progeny of judicially created principles that preexisted
the regulation, as well as by the CEQ regulation.
B. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court rejected Ninth Circuit reasoning, in effect holding
agency (CEQ) interpretation above conflicting judicial principles. The
Supreme Court held that the new CEQ regulation applied in Robertson,7
finding that since the amended regulation had abandoned the "worst case"
language, so must the Ninth Circuit, despite conflicting case law. The
appellate court had exercised its judicial power-guided by statutory
purpose, by legislative history, by case law, as well as by CEQ regulations-to review the agency's handling of uncertainty. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court found that such an exercise of power was improper.72 The
Supreme Court based this decision primarily on a line of cases, including
Andrus v. Sierra Club,73 that accorded substantial deference to agency
interpretations. 74 Hence, the adequacy of this EIS was fundamentally
entangled with the issue of the scope of judicial power to review agency
activity.
The Court acknowledged that less judicial deference may be appropriate
when administrative guidelines conflict with an earlier, more demanding
agency regulation. 7' However, "substantial deference is nonetheless appropriate if there appears to have been good reason for the change."76
69. 695 F.2d at 974.
70. Id. at 971.
71. The grandfather clause of the new regulation, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(c) (1987):
specifies that agencies have the option of applying the old or the new regulation to
ElSs commenced prior to May 27, 1986, that are still "in progress" after that date.
Because the Court of Appeals ordered that the Forest Service revise the Early Winters
Study, and because such a revision is necessary even though we hold today that the
Court of Appeals erred in part, the Study remains 'in progress' and thus the Forest
Service is entitled to rely on the new regulation.
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 104, L.Ed.2d 351, 109 S.Ct. 1835,
1849, n.18.
72. Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1848.
73. Supra note 48.
74. Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1848. The Court did not make reference to its prior decision which
limited that deference. The Supreme Court held in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1983), that courts should defer to agency interpretations when congressional intent
is unclear and the agency interpretation is a reasonable one.
75. Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1848.
76. Id. (quoting Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979)), 442 U.S. at 358).
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As the Court found good reason for the CEQ amendment, the new regulation was entitled to substantial deference. 77
To buttress its position, the Court asserted that CEQ's abandonment
of the worst case requirement is not inconsistent with any previous judicial
interpretation of NEPA.7" The Court appeared unwilling to rely solely on
the deference principle, when doing so would also nullify the precedential
value of preexisting judicial principles interpreting NEPA.79 Consequently, it carefully construed judicial principles to be consistent with the
new regulation. The Supreme Court distinguished these principles from
the worst case requirement, criticizing the Ninth Circuit's reliance on
Sigler:8
[T]he regulation, in fact, was not a codification of prior judicial
decisions .... Sigler, however, simply recognized that the "worst
case analysis" regulation codified the "judicially created principl[e]"
that an EIS must "consider the probabilities of the occurrence of any
environmental effects it discusses." 8 1
The Supreme Court found that an agency's consideration of probabilities
of impacts occurring need not be in the form of a worst case analysis.8"
This Robertson holding is logically based upon the principle of Andrus
v. Sierra Club:83 the regulations of the CEQ are controlling regardless of
conflicting precedent.
C. Commentary on "Worst Case Analysis" Decision
The consequence of rejecting Ninth Circuit jurisprudence is to give the
CEQ full authority over interpretation of NEPA. The new regulation
incorporates a probability threshold derived from early NEPA case law
such that agencies are only required to analyze an adverse impact when
credible scientific evidence demonstrates reasonable foreseeability.' Thus,
the CEQ moves an adequate EIS on the spectrum from environmentally
conscious goals to environmentally neutral goals in accordance with Reagan Administration policies.
77. The Court mentioned in dicta that the CEQ intended the new regulation to better serve EIS
purposes by focusing on impacts of greatest concern to those involved, rather than on improbable,
highly speculative impacts. Id.
78. Id.
79. Interestingly, the significance of NEPA case law development has been recognized by a
member of the Supreme Court. Justice Marshall, concurring in part in Kleppe v. Sierra Club: "[Tihis
vaguely worded statute seems designed to serve as no more than a catalyst for development of a
'common law' of NEPA. To date, the courts have responded in just that manner and have created
such a 'common law.' .
Indeed, that development is the source of NEPA's success." 427 U.S.
390, 421 (1975).
80. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983).
81. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 104, L.Ed.2d 351, 109 S.Ct.
1835, 1848 (quoting Sigler, 695 F.2d at 970-71) (1989).
82. Id.
83. Supra note 48.
84. Note, supra note 44.
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The Court also narrowed the scope of judicial review by giving the
CEQ the last word in interpreting its regulations, an interpretation which
will now be difficult to successfully challenge. Ironically, afterRobertson,
President Carter's efforts to promulgate binding CEQ regulations for the
protection of the environment may inadequately safeguard NEPA policy.
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of NEPA in achieving its sweeping policy
goals will now be heavily dependent upon the executive powers that be,
and will swing with the political pendulum. Judicial deference goes too
far when legislation intending to secure environmental considerations in
federal actions is dependent upon the whims of the executive branch.
Robertson settles a longstanding judicial controversy on the worst case
analysis and CEQ regulatory authority. With the abandonment of the
worst case analysis, it is unclear whether the new CEQ regulation will
improve EIS analysis of potential impacts when scientific certainty is
lacking in an agency. Perhaps it was wise to abandon the worst case
analysis-a technically difficult analysis. But the danger in this decision
lies in the overstressed deference to an agency that amounts to a rubberstamping.
In practice, the Robertson decision might encourage deception in an
EIS. Under the new regulation, EIS preparation will be easier for agencies, as unfavorable environmental impacts might be ignored by simply
labeling them too improbable (not reasonably foreseeable) for mandatory
analysis under the new regulation. Public or political opposition to a
proposed project (arguably an environmentally protective mechanism
Congress intended an EIS to provide)85 that would otherwise ensue when
an EIS described a worst case scenario can now be more easily evaded
by project proponents. A regulation true to NEPA would fall somewhere
in between the two.
H. THE MITIGATION ISSUE
A. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis
Regarding the mitigation issue," the Ninth Circuit held that the district
court erred in holding that the EIS adequately discussed adverse envi85. See generally, 2.1075, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 40415, 40416 (1969) (Conference Report on NEPA).
86. CEQ regulations define "mitigation" to include:
(a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts of an action.
(b) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action and its
implementation.
(c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environment.
(d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and maintenance
operations during the life of the action.
(e) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources or
environments. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (1987).
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ronmental impacts and mitigation measures.8 7 The Ninth Circuit found
the EIS inadequate. In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit linked impacts and
mitigation measures together, as the CEQ does in its regulations.88 The
Ninth Circuit criticized as illogical the Forest Service's assessment of
only those impacts that would flow from a project that included mitigation
measures, when those mitigation measures were not even yet specified. 9
Also, the Ninth Circuit construed CEQ regulations and NEPA to require
that the air quality management plan ordered by the Regional Forester
be developed before issuing a permit, not after." Thus, the Ninth Circuit
held that the EIS' discussion of mitigation steps, absent the air quality
management plan, was inadequate. The Ninth Circuit believed that the
EIS should be judged on its own merit; subsequent development of an
elaborate mitigation plan would not absolve this EIS of its failures under
NEPA. 9'
Moreover, the appellate court held that NEPA requires that mitigation
steps be developed in detail, measured for effectiveness, and adopted.9 2
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit deemed the EIS additionally inadequate
because the agreement between the developer and local governments93
"offers no assurance whatsoever that the vague mitigation objectives...
87. Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 816 (9th Cir. 1987).
88. Supra note 15. For example, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16, requires including mitigation in the
discussion of environmental consequences:
The discussion will include the environmental impacts of the alternatives including
the proposed action, any adverse envitonmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented, the relationship between short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and any
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the
proposal should it be implemented .... It shall include discussions of:
(e) Energy requirements and conservation potential of various alternatives and
mitigation measures.
(f) Natural or depletable resource requirements and conservation potential of various
alternatives and mitigation measures.
(g) Urban quality, historic and cultural resources, and the design of the built environment, including the reuse and conservation potential of various alternatives and
mitigation measures.
(h) Means to mitigate adverse environmental impacts (if not fully covered under
§ 1502.14(f).
43 Fed.Reg. 55994 (1978) (codified at 44 Fed.Reg. 873 (1979). 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (1979).
89. In response to citizens' argument that the mule deer herd's survival may be threatened by
development, the court noted:
In contrast, the Forest Service believes that "with the implementation of mitigation
measures," the impacts to the mule deer will be minor. This court fails to see the logic
with which the Forest Service reaches this conclusion, since not only has the effectiveness of these mitigation measures not yet been assessed, but the mitigation measures
themselves have yet to be developed.
Methow, 833 F.2d at 817. Thus there was the additional lack of a guarantee that any steps would
in fact be taken.
90. Id. at 818.
91. Id. at 819.
92. Id. (quoting, inter alia, CEQ regulations 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h) (1988)).
93. Memorandum of Understanding, required by the Regional Forester upon issuance of the
permit. Id.
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would ever in fact be achieved or even that effective measures would
ever be designed (let alone implemented)" if development occurs.' The
court reasoned that since most of the mitigation discussion in the EIS
merely suggested possible measures that third parties might but were not
obligated to implement, the EIS was inadequate and improper.
The Ninth Circuit judged the EIS against informing purposes of an
EIS. It interpreted discussion of mitigation to be adequate if it enabled
the agency to make a fully informed assessment of environmental impacts.
Here, "merely conceptual" mitigation measures were inadequate because
they did not enable that fully informed decisionmaking process.95
B. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court discerned the issue differently than did the Ninth
Circuit: the Court did not address the Ninth Circuit's charge that conclusions based on inadequately discussed mitigation were illogical. Instead,
the Supreme Court focused its attention on rejecting the idea that NEPA
imposes a substantive duty to mitigate, drawing from a line of cases that
adamantly reiterate that NEPA imposes procedural rather than substantive
duties.96 That same line of cases limited judicial review to agency decisionmaking procedures, excluding substantive decisions. Because the
Court viewed the Ninth Circuit decision as an improper review of an
agency's substantive conclusion, it reversed the Ninth Circuit and held
the mitigation discussion to be adequate.
1. Background
Relying primarily on three cases, the Court based its analysis on the
scope of judicial power to review agency activity, as well as on interpretation of NEPA. At issue in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council7 was the proper scope of judicial
review of the Atomic Energy Commission's procedures for licensing
nuclear power plants. The CEQ had issued guidelines recommending
energy conservation as an alternative. The Supreme Court required deference to the agency's decision, holding that the appellate court had
exceeded its proper scope when it remanded the permit. The Court further
noted that "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the
Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural. See 42
U.S.C. § 4332 ....
It is to insure a fully informed and well-considered
decision, not necessarily" one the courts would have reached.9"
94.
95.
1835,
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 819-20.
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 104, L.Ed.2d 351, 109 S.Ct.
1839 (1989).
See discussion of these cases infra "Background."
433 U.S. 519 (1978).
Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558.
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A second case, Strycker's Bay NeighborhoodCouncil, Inc. v. Karlen,9
relied heavily on Vermont Yankee in upholding an EIS under NEPA. The
Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD) had ignored environmental impacts, finding the factor of project delay dispositive to the
decision to proceed with redevelopment. After suit, the Second Circuit
held that HUD's consideration of environmental impacts of redesignation
of a site for low-income housing in its EIS was inadequate. The Court
of Appeals said that the agency must give "determinative weight" to
environmental considerations in reaching its decision. '" The Supreme
Court reversed, asserting that the agency need only consider environmental factors. Strycker's Bay significantly described the judicial role
under NEPA as a duty to review process, not substance. Citing Yankee
as support, the Supreme Court held that the Court is not authorized to
review the merits of an agency decision under NEPA, but rather only to
ensure that the agency considered environmental consequences. "o
The Robertson Court heavily relied on Baltimore Gas and Electric Co.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council' to conclude that no mitigation
plan is necessary, since NEPA is a procedural, rather than substantive
mandate. 0 3 In Baltimore, the Court reiterated that "NEPA does not require
agencies to adopt any particular internal decisionmaking structure.""
The issue in Baltimore was the validity of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission rule that permanent storage of nuclear wastes should be assumed
to have no environmental impact and should not affect licensing decisions.
The Court upheld the rule because it deemed this assumption to be a
decisionmaking device, not a conclusion.' 5
Congress in enacting NEPA, .

.

. did not require agencies to elevate

environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations....
Rather, it required only that the agency take a "hard look" at the
environmental consequences before taking a major action.... The

role of the courts is simply to ensure that the agency has adequately
considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions and
that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious."

C. Commentary on Mitigation Decision
Baltimore supports the Robertson holding that NEPA demands no substantive duty to actually mitigate. Indeed, Baltimore could be viewed to
99. 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
100. Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227.
101. Id.
102. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
103. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 104, L.Ed.2d 351, 109 S.Ct.
1835, 1847 (1989).
104. Baltimore Gas and Electric, 462 U.S. at 100.
105. Id. at 97.
106. Id.
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address whether NEPA requires an agency to choose one mitigation plan
over another. However, Baltimore does not address the extent to which
an EIS must discuss any mitigation plan. Moreover, Baltimore supports
the Ninth Circuit's position that the courts' role is to ensure adequate
consideration and disclosure of impacts. 7 The Supreme Court used Baltimore, however, to ignore the real issue in Methow Valley, which was
the extent of the duty to analyze impacts, not mitigation of them.
The Supreme Court's assessment thus reverses the most sensible conclusion of the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court stated that as long as
impacts are adequately identified and evaluated, NEPA does not require
valuing environmental interests foremost.' Therefore, the Court reasoned, an agency need not develop a mitigation plan and implement it.
The Court concluded that impacts are adequately identified and evaluated.
But the Court effectively ignored the fact that adequacy of identification
of impacts in the EIS is suspect because of reliance on the implementation
of unspecified and optional mitigation steps.
The Court applied the deference principle in interpreting CEQ regulations on mitigation"°9 as requiring only a hard look at environmental
consequences, but not necessarily a look toward environmental preservation."'0 The Court also stated that since mitigation of offsite impacts
depends upon cooperation of third parties, mitigation cannot be required
before the permit issues-another reversal of the lower court. "'
The Court reiterated general principles broadly where a holding more
specifically articulated was called for. In its fervor to keep NEPA procedural, the Court may have read more into the Ninth Circuit's opinion
than was there. The Ninth Circuit interpreted a duty to adequately develop
mitigation steps, in keeping with the purposes of an EIS. But Supreme
Court jurisprudence lends itself to an emphasis on clarifying general
principles; subtle distinctions sometimes suffer. Justice Marshall alluded
to this foreseen imprecision in his dissent in Strycker's Bay.
In Strycker's Bay, Justice Marshall dissented to the Court's broad
application of Vermont Yankee to reach a simplistic conclusion." 2 According to Marshall, Vermont Yankee discusses NEPA with regard to
judicial review, and its holding (that administrative decisions should be
107. The Ninth Circuit logically found such consideration inadequate because the EIS's assessment
of impacts depended upon an inadequate mitigation plan. Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional
Forrester, 833 F.2d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 1987).
108. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 104, L.Ed.2d 351, 109 S.Ct.
1835, 1846 (1989) (citing Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227-228).
109. "To be sure, one important ingredient of an EIS is the discussion of steps that can be taken
to mitigate adverse environmental consequences." Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1847 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
110. Id. at 1847.
111. Id. at 1847, n.16.
112. Strycker's Bay Neightborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 229 (Marshall, J.
dissenting).
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set aside only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute) applies to all administrative decisions, not only to NEPA
cases. 113 Although NEPA demands of agencies' actions are essentially
procedural in nature, Marshall explained, NEPA does not necessarily
preclude any substantive requirement toward pursuing its substantive
goals."1 4 By not recognizing this, Vermont Yankee's holding was overbroad.
Similarly, the Robertson Court imprecisely articulated the holding. The
Court decided that the EIS adequately discussed mitigation for the purposes of the Forest Service's first-stage analysis in a three-stage review
process, when indirect (offsite) impacts are uncertain and depend upon
third parties. But it did not call attention to these important details, and
they could be easily overlooked. The initial EIS was merely intended to
examine the possibilities for providing a "winter sports opportunity" on
Forest Land. It did not, supposedly, purport to examine the effects of
construction and operation of MRI's project in particular, although it was
looking to the MRI proposal. It must be remembered that in this case
lower courts relied on a6 master plan and a further environmental assessment at a later stage."
The fact that the Supreme Court did not explicitly tailor its holding to
these unique facts cautions strict scrutiny of future uses of this case. In
one subsequent case, Robertson was cited inaccurately for the extreme
proposition that it is not "necessary for the FEIS to describe mitigation
measures.""' Further distressing implications for NEPA would be appropriately tempered by a careful, narrow reading of the holding: this
case does not reach the question of mitigation adequacy for anything but
an initial EIS in a multi-tiered Forest Service review process, which also
relies on third party, offsite cooperation.
The imprecision in this opinion betrays the inherently confusing nature
of the mitigation aspect of an EIS. The interested public surely finds it
confusing that mitigation steps are written in an "adequate" EIS so as to
imply that they will be carried out," 8 and that therefore the project's
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forrester, 833 F.2d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1987).
116. The Magistrate found that "'in this EIS there is more-not much more-but more than a
mere listing of mitigation measures.'" Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1844 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert.
at 41a).
117. Collin County, Texas v. Homeowners Association for Values Essential to Neighborhoods
(HAVEN), 716 F. Supp. 953, 970 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (citing, but not quoting, Robertson, 109 S.Ct.
at 1847). In Collin County, the court held there existed no material issue of fact. Id. at 974. A
Declaratory Judgment was granted that an FEIS, although it did not discuss mitigation, was sufficient
under NEPA.
118. For example, note the implied guarantee in the language recommending certain mitigation
steps:
1. The County will initiate the formation of an Air Quality Control Authority....
2. The County will develop an airshed management plan .... [Tihe following mitigation measures will be considered:
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negative impacts will be minimized, when this is not, in fact, the case.
In this way, public concern, and perhaps opposition also, are unfortunately
minimized.
The Court's treatment of the Robertson EIS does little to alleviate this
problem, and may exacerbate it. For example, one specific effect of
Robertson is to change the conditions under which the permit was initially
issued. The Regional Forester had required that an air quality management
plan be develpped at the time he issued the permit so as to avoid degradation from the very start. 9 The Supreme Court removed this requirement, undermining the value of the EIS.
But even more disastrous, mitigation measures now need only be perfunctorily listed to satisfy the requirement of "discussion" in an EIS.
Thus, the misleading nature of an EIS will not be discouraged: conceptual
mitigation steps (and impacts assessed dependent upon them) will be
adequate, without any guarantee that they will be developed or implemented.
This cursory treatment of mitigation, that the Supreme Court upholds,
frustrates even the informational purposes of an EIS. Courts have limited
the purposes of an EIS to two procedural ones: providing an informational
guide for agencies on the environmental aspects of projects, and disclosing
this information to the public for comment. Robertson verifies that the
EIS is a mandate of pure process; the Supreme Court unanimously rejected
the long line of circuit decisions that gave some small measure of substantive quality to the purposes of NEPA. Yet even the process is impeded
by the Robertson holding. A merely conceptual listing of mitigation does
not fully inform the public, nor the agency, in its decisionmaking process.
An adequate discussion of mitigation in an EIS must do that, even if it
need not necessarily choose environmental values over others under NEPA.
CONCLUSION
The Robertson decision is fraught with inconsistencies. Substantial
judicial deference to agency decisionmaking tells the public to trust that
-Development of land use codes ...
-Requiring all new construction to be fully weatherized...
-Restricting the number of fireplaces and wood stoves. At a minimum, few
fireplaces should be allowed in accommodations constructed for tourist use.
-Encouraging the use of alternative, non-polluting energy sources.
-Establishing a certification mechanism for wood stoves and fireplace inserts.
-Establishing an air pollution monitoring system specifically designed to alert
local residents to impending pollution episodes and to record long term changes
in air quality levels. Such long term data will be used to evaluate the success
or failure of the mitigation and impose more stringent measures if standards
are violated.
-Development of enforcement measures to assure that standards will be met."
Robertson, 109 S.Ct. at 1841, n.5, (quoting Early Winters Study 68-69).
119. Id. at 1843-44. The trial court had upheld the adequacy of the EIS because the Regional
Forester relied on an agreement by permittees to devise mitigation arrangements with local governments.
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the agency will be conscientious, whether it be the Forest Service in
fulfilling NEPA or the CEQ interpreting NEPA. But at the same time,
the decision sends a message to agencies that in preparing an EIS, they
can be a little more lax with regard to mitigation and uncertain impacts.
The resulting reduced informational value of an EIS, both to the public
and to the agency, will also reduce public trust in the agency.
Finally, an EIS that does not serve the procedural goal of fully informed
decisions also does not further substantive policy goals of NEPA. Can it
really be true, as the Supreme Court says, that "NEPA merely prohibits
uninformed-rather than unwise-agency action?" 20 How, then, to ever
achieve "NEPA's significant substantive goals for the Nation," acknowledged even in Vermont Yankee?'2' The purpose and policy of NEPA"to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere . . .'"' and to "use all practicable means and
measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony"'23 have been shortchanged.
JENNIFER R. BARTLIT

120. Id. at 1846.
121. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 558 (1978).
122. 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1988).
123. 42 U.S.C. §4331(a) (1988).

